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More than some other area, the metaphysics of memory displays the pattern towards interdisciplinarity noted above, and work on this area generally shades into philosophy of psychology (Rowlands 2009) and philosophy of neuroscience (Bickle 2011). Related work in the philosophy of psychology is mentioned right here as appropriate; for more specialised work within the philosophy of neuroscience, see the entry on that subject. The central goal of mainstream research on the metaphysics of memory is to develop a principle of remembering: a basic however informative account of what it is for someone to remember something. As we are going to see, nevertheless, there are multiple kinds of memory. It's unclear whether it's feasible to develop a principle of remembering that applies to all of those, and finally it might show necessary to develop multiple theories of remembering, corresponding to the a number of kinds of memory. 2002), philosophers have singled episodic memory out for particular attention on the ground that it provides the rememberer with a singular type of access to previous events.

For some, certainly, only episodic memory actually merits the name "memory" (Klein 2015; B. Russell 1921). Reflecting this focus, this entry will likely be involved primarily with theories of episodic remembering: accounts of what it is for somebody to recollect an occasion from his private past. Due, maybe, to their give attention to episodic memory, philosophers have generally approached memory as a capability exercised by single people. 1994; cf. Barash 2016; Michaelian & Sutton forthcoming) and which has recently given birth to the multidisciplinary field of memory research (Roediger & Wertsch 2008; Segesten & Wüstenberg forthcoming). It has also come to include points arising from the more moderen tradition of research on exterior memory in cognitive science which views remembering by the lens of distributed (Hutchins 1995) or prolonged (Clark & Chalmers 1998) theories of cognition. While the entry is anxious primarily with individual memory, these more recent issues will be mentioned as nicely.

Before turning to theories of episodic remembering, it will likely be helpful to situate episodic memory with respect to different sorts of memory. In its broadest sense, "memory" refers to the various outcomes of the various types of studying of which people and different brokers are capable. Any modification of an agent’s behavioural tendencies on account of its experience thus probably counts as memory, making the category of memory very broad certainly. Regardless of the breadth of the class, however, there's an approximate consensus on a taxonomy of sorts of human memory. Philosophers typically distinguish amongst three foremost kinds of memory. 1911) and Russell (1921), for instance, distinguished between behavior memory and recollective memory, MemoryWave whereas Broad (1925) and Furlong (1951) further distinguished between recollective memory and propositional memory (cf. Ayer (1956; D. Locke 1971)). These distinctions align moderately nicely with these drawn by a taxonomy which, originating in psychology, has increasingly turn into standard in more recent philosophy.

The taxonomy in question, developed in detail by Squire (2009), Memory Wave divides the overarching category of memory into declarative and nondeclarative memory. Declarative memory, in turn, is divided into episodic memory, corresponding roughly to recollective memory, and semantic memory, corresponding roughly to propositional memory. A first pass at distinguishing episodic from semantic memory may be made by observing that the previous is concerned with the occasions of one’s private previous particularly (e.g., I remember speaking at a convention in Budapest), while the later is anxious with the world basically (I keep in mind that Budapest is the capital of Hungary). It is essential to note, MemoryWave nonetheless, that semantic memory can also be typically involved with previous occasions. One can have reminiscences that concern occasions that one did not oneself experience (I do not forget that my colleague spoke at a workshop in Rome, though I didn't hear him converse); when one does, one remembers semantically, not episodically.